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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                  v.
       SALVATORE SPARACIO,
       Appellant 
___________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 2-94-cr-00127-4
(District Judge: The Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter ) 
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 5, 2009
Before: McKEE, JORDAN, and LOURIE  Circuit Judges.*
(Filed: February 23, 2009) 
2OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge,
Salvatore Sparacio appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to modify his
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.  
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not recite the factual or procedural history.  We exercise plenary review over legal questions
concerning the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Batista, 483
F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Sparacio argues that the district court should have granted the motion he filed to reduce
his sentence of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Section 3852(c)(2)  allows a
sentencing reduction if the defendant  “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”  Sparacio
claims that the adoption of Amendment 591 mandating that the initial selection of an offense
guideline be based only on the statute of conviction, and not on related conduct, justifies a
reduction of his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).  U.S.S.G., App. C, amend. 591 (2003); see
United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2001).  
However the sentencing court correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(A) when Sparacio was
sentenced.  That guideline applies to “Unlawful Conduct Relating to Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations.”  Sparacio does not contend that the court erred in selecting that
guideline.  Rather, he contends that under Amendment 591 the district court should not have
applied the cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 and § 2A1.5(c)(2), which specify a base offense
3level based on First Degree Murder and Conspiracy to Commit Murder.  Sparacio rests his
argument on his contention that there was insufficient proof that a death occurred as a result of
his racketeering activity.   
Sparacio’s argument confuses the concept of “offense guideline” with “base offense
level.”  Amendment 591's restriction on the use of judicially-found facts applies only to a
determination of the offense guideline, and not the base offense level.  See United States v.
Rivera, 293 F.3d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The plain wording of Amendment 591 applies only to
the choice of the applicable offense guideline, not to the subsequent selection of the base offense
level.”); United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(“Amendment 591 directs the district court to apply the guideline dictated by the statute of
conviction, but does not constrain the use of judicially found facts to select a base offense level
within the relevant guideline.”). 
Here, the sentencing court’s selection of § 2E1.1 as the applicable guideline was based
solely on the statute of conviction, thus satisfying the requirements of Amendment 591. 
Accordingly, despite Sparacio’s very intricate argument to the contrary, the district court did not
have authority to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2).  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). (“A
reduction in . . . imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore not
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if . . . an amendment listed in subsection (c) does not
have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.”).
Moreover,  reduced to its essence, Sparacio’s § 3582(c)(2) argument is in reality nothing
more than yet another attempt to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his culpability for
murder.  He argues: “the offense of conviction did not result in the death of Michael Ciancaglini,
4and Sparacio was not an active participant in the murder of  Michael Ciancaglini. There was no
evidence that Sparacio had specific intent to kill Michael Ciancaglini. Accordingly, it was wrong
to apply USSG 2A1.1, the guideline for first degree murder.” Appellant’s Br. at 17.  
Sparacio refuses to acknowledge that the underlying murder was established beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial, and we subsequently affirmed that conviction on direct appeal. 
Accordingly, his claim that the murder of Michael Ciancaglini was not part of the charged
racketeering activity is meritless.
II.  
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the order of the district court.
